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Dogwhistles,	Political	Manipulation	and	Philosophy	of	Language	(Draft,	1	February	2016:	Do	not	cite	without	permission)		Jennifer	Saul			 		You	start	out	in	1954	by	saying,	"Nigger,	nigger,	nigger."	By	1968,	you	can't	say	"nigger"	—	that	hurts	you.	Backfires.	So	you	say	stuff	like	forced	busing,	states'	rights	and	all	that	stuff.	You're	getting	so	abstract	now	[that]	you're	talking	about	cutting	taxes,	and	all	these	things	you're	talking	about	are	totally	economic	things	and	a	byproduct	of	them	is	[that]	blacks	get	hurt	worse	than	whites.	And	subconsciously	maybe	that	is	part	of	it.	I'm	not	saying	that.	But	I'm	saying	that	if	it	is	getting	that	abstract,	and	that	coded,	that	we	are	doing	away	with	the	racial	problem	one	way	or	the	other.	You	follow	me	—	because	obviously	sitting	around	saying,	"We	want	to	cut	this,"	is	much	more	abstract	than	even	the	busing	thing,	and	a	hell	of	a	lot	more	abstract	than	"Nigger,	nigger."	Lee	Atwater,	quoted	in	Lamis	1990				In	recent	years,	two	very	welcome	changes	have	come	to	philosophy	of	language.		The	philosophy	of	language	that	I	was	“raised”	in	was	that	of	the	eighties	and	nineties	in	the	US.		Our	focus	was	almost	exclusively	on	semantic	content,	reference	and	truth	conditions.		I	say	“almost	exclusively”	because	Grice’s	notion	of	conversational	implicature	was	a	notable	exception	to	this—this	notion	was	the	topic	of	great	interest,	because	it	allowed	semantic	theorists	to	explain	away	
intuitions	that	seemed	to	conflict	with	their	preferred	theory	as	“merely	pragmatic”.				Recently,	philosophy	of	language	has	broadened	in	two	significant	ways.		The	most	important	shift,	to	my	mind,	is	a	move	to	consider	the	ethical	and	political	dimensions	of	language.		These	were	never	forgotten	by	philosophers	more	broadly,	but	until	recently	they	were	left	almost	exclusively	to	ethicists	and	political	philosophers.			Now,	however,	philosophers	of	language	are	working	to	understand	hate	speech,	political	manipulation,	propaganda	and	lies.		These	issues—vital	in	the	real	world—have	not	yet	become	central	to	philosophy	of	language.		But	they	are	at	least	a	part	of	the	conversation,	in	a	way	that	they	weren’t	twenty	years	ago.		With	this	shift	(though	not	wholly	as	a	result	of	it),	has	come	an	increasing	interest	in	matters	other	than	semantic	content	and	reference.		Implicature,	accommodation	and	speech	acts	are	the	central	notions	in	these	new	debates,	rather	than	semantic	content.1		And	yet,	I	will	be	arguing,	these	new	discussions	have	not	yet	moved	far	enough	away	from	the	focus	on	content.		Fully	making	sense	of	politically	manipulative	speech	will	require	a	detailed	engagement	with	certain	forms	of	speech	that	function	at	an	implicit	level—with	something	other	than	semantically	expressed	
or	pragmatically	conveyed	content;	and	with	effects	of	utterances	that	are	their	very	point	and	that	nonetheless	vanish	as	soon	as	they	are	made	explicit.		None	of	the	machinery	developed	in	detail	so	far	is	equipped	for	this	task.				This	task,	however,	is	an	absolutely	vital	one.		Dogwhistles,	we	will	see,	are	a	disturbingly	important	tool	of	covert	political	manipulation.		They	are	in	fact	one	of	the	most	powerful	forms	of	political	speech,	allowing	for	people	to	be	manipulated	in	ways	that	they	would	resist	if	the	manipulation	was	carried	out	more	openly—	often	drawing	on	racist	attitudes	that	are	consciously	rejected.		If	philosophers	focus	only	on	more	overt	speech,	which	does	its	work	via	content	expressed	or	otherwise	consciously	conveyed,	they	will	miss	much	of	what	is																																																									1	This	isn’t	meant	to	suggest	that	speech	act	theory	is	new,	just	that	it	had	fallen	out	of	fashion	at	least	in	the	circles	I	moved	in.	
most	powerful	and	pernicious	in	the	speech	of	our	political	culture.		This	paper	is	a	call	to	start	paying	attention	to	these	more	covert	speech	acts,	and	a	first	attempt	at	beginning	to	theorise	them.		
1. Dogwhistles		My	focus	in	this	paper	is	on	dogwhistles.		‘Dogwhistle’	is	a	relatively	new	term	in	politics,	arising	out	of	US	political	journalism	in	the	1980s.	The	first	recorded	use	of	the	term	seems	to	have	been	by	Richard	Morin	of	the	Washington	Post,	discussing	a	curious	phenomenon	that	had	been	noticed	in	opinion	polling.	Subtle	changes	in	question-wording	sometimes	produce	remarkably	different	results…	researchers	call	this	the	‘Dog	Whistle	Effect’:	Respondents	hear	something	in	the	question	that	researchers	do	not.		(1988)	The	idea	of	a	political	dogwhistle	shifted	somewhat	over	the	next	decades	to	focus	mainly	on	a	kind	of	deliberate	manipulation,	usually	by	politicians	(or	their	handlers),	designed	to	be	unnoticed	by	most	of	the	public.		(We	will	refine	this	definition	over	the	course	of	this	paper.)	We	will	see,	though,	that	this	sort	of	manipulation	comes	in	importantly	different	varieties,	which	we	will	tease	apart	and	examine	over	the	course	of	this	paper.		Dogwhistles	may	be	explicit	or	implicit,	and	within	each	of	these	categories	they	may	be	intentional	or	unintentional.		
2.	Intentional	Dogwhistles	
2.1 Explicit	Intentional	Dogwhistles		Kimberly	Witten	(forthcoming)	is	one	of	very	few	linguists	who	has	worked	on	dogwhistles.		Her	focus	is	exclusively	on	the	sort	of	dogwhistle	that	I	call	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle,	and	her	definition	(of	‘dogwhistle’)	is	an	excellent	one	for	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle.		
A[n explicit intentional] dogwhistle is a speech act designed, with intent, to allow 
two plausible interpretations, with one interpretation being a private, coded 
message targeted for a subset of the general audience, and concealed in such a 
way that this general audience is unaware of the existence of the second, coded 
interpretation. (Witten: 2) 
Although the main interest of dogwhistles lies in their political use, Witten rightly 
argues that the concept applies more broadly.  As a parent, I was shocked to revisit 
some of my favourite childhood entertainments and see much that I had missed as a 
child.  Watching Bugs Bunny with my small son, I was surprised to see references to 
old movies that children couldn’t be expected to know, and even more surprised to 
see that one of these was Last Tango in Paris.  Finding these references of course 
made the endless re-viewings less tedious.  And, of course, this was the intent of their 
makers.  Witten suggests that this should be considered a dogwhistle—a concealed 
message for a subset of the cartoons’ general audience.2 
The	most	important	sort	of	intentional	explicit	dogwhistle,	however,	is	that	used	by	politicians.		Dogwhistle	utterances	allow	a	candidate	to	send	a	message	to	one	portion	of	the	electorate	that	other	portions	might	find	alienating.		These	will	be	my	main	focus	here.	We’ll	start	with	some	examples.	
 
2.1.1 “Wonder-working	power”	George	W.	Bush	faced	a	tricky	situation	with	respect	to	his	faith	throughout	his	candidacies.		He	desperately	needed	the	votes	of	fundamentalist	Christians,	and	yet	it	was	also	clear	that	many	others—whose	votes	he	also	needed	for	the	general	elections—were	made	nervous	by	fundamentalist	Christianity.		The	solution	his	speech-writers	used	was	to	dogwhistle	to	the	fundamentalists.		A	nice	example	of	this	is	Bush’s	utterance	in	his	2003	State	of	the	Union	speech:		
Yet there's power, wonder-working power, in the goodness and idealism and faith 
of the American people. (Noah 2004) 
																																																								2	Witten	discusses	different	examples,	but	the	idea	of	dogwhistles	for	parents	in	children’s	entertainment	is	hers.	
To a non-fundamentalist this is an ordinary piece of fluffy political boilerplate, which 
passes without notice.  But a fundamentalist Christian will hear the dogwhistle.  
Amongst fundamentalists, “wonder- working power” is a favoured phrase that refers 
specifically to the power of Christ.  There are two messages a fundamentalist might 
take from this.  The first is a kind of translation into their idiolect, to yield an 
explicitly Christian message that would alienate many: 
Yet there's power, the power of Christ, in the goodness and idealism and faith of 
the American people.3 
The second is simply the fact that Bush does speak their idiolect—indicating that he is 
one of them. 
 
The first message is very clearly an explicit intentional dogwhistle: it is a coded, 
concealed message, intended for just a subgroup of the general audience.  In fact, it 
functions rather like the exploitation of a little-known ambiguity.  The second is a 
little messier.  It is somewhat like speaking in a regional accent that gives a feeling of 
kinship to a particular audience.  But it’s crucially different because, unlike an accent, 
it can’t be heard by everyone.  Arguably, then (assuming that it is done intentionally), 
this is still an explicit intentional dogwhistle—it is a coded message for a subgroup, 
concealed by an apparently straightforward message. 	
2.1.2 “Dred	Scott”		George	W.	Bush	also,	like	many	conservatives,	makes	a	point	of	declaring	his	opposition	to	the	Dred	Scott	decision,	which	1957	affirmed	that	slaves	remain	their	owners’	property	even	when	taken	to	free	territories.		This	is	somewhat	baffling	to	those	it’s	not	directed	to,	who	take	it	for	granted	that	even	a	right-wing	Republican	opposes	slavery,	and	who	think	this	opposition	should	go	without	saying.		But	most	viewers	were	not	who	Bush	was	addressing	with	this	dogwhistle.		Bush	was	addressing	the	anti-abortion	right,	and	he	was	dogwhistling	about	his	opposition	to	abortion.																																																											3	Presenting	this	paper	to	audiences	in	the	US,	I’ve	found	that	this	interpretation	is	controversial.			Some	Christians	think	it’s	exactly	right,	while	others	think	it	would	be	wrong	to	read	it	this	way,	and	that	doing	so	would	yield	a	heretical	utterance.		For	the	latter	group,	obviously	the	second	interpretation	in	the	text	will	make	more	sense.	
	This	dogwhistle	functions	somewhat	differently:	it	works	because	it	is	very	common	for	right-wing	commentators	to	discuss	the	Dred	Scott	decision	when	discussing	abortion	rights,	but	in	a	variety	of	ways.		Sometimes	it	is	an	example	of	a	bad	Supreme	Court	decision	in	need	of	overturning	(like	Roe	V	Wade).		Sometimes	it	is	a	part	of	an	analogy	between	the	unrecognized	personhood	of	slaves	and	(purported)	unrecognized	personhood	of	fetuses.		But	it	is	so	common	to	discuss	it	when	discussing	abortion—and,	crucially,	so	baffling	to	discuss	it	otherwise—that	it	can	serve	to	signal	Bush’s	opposition	to	abortion,	and	his	desire	to	see	Roe	overturned.		The	exact	details	of	how	this	one	works	are	a	little	bit	murky.		It	may	work	like	the	old	movie	references	in	children’s	cartoons:	designed	to	trigger	allusions	for	those	in	the	know.		Those	who	know	the	prominent	role	of	Dred	Scott	in	anti-abortion	discussions	will	know	that	Bush	is	deliberately	reminding	them	of	these,	and	take	from	this	the	message	that	he	too	is	anti-abortion,	and	thinks	Roe	should	be	overturned.		Alternatively,	it	may	even	be	that	“I	oppose	Dred	Scott”	and	similar	utterances	have	come	to	serve	as	generalized	conversational	implicatures	indicating	opposition	to	abortion.		One	can	certainly	tell	a	story	of	how	they’d	be	calculated:		He’s	stating	his	opposition	to	Dred	Scott.	But	everyone	
opposes	Dred	Scott,	and	that’s	not	relevant	to	the	question	he	was	being	asked.		He	
must	be	trying	to	convey	something	else—that	he	is	opposed	to	abortion,	like	those	
other	people	who	talk	about	Dred	Scott.		Either	way,	this	is	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle:	it	is	a	conveying	of	a	coded,	concealed	message	to	a	subset	of	the	general	audience.		 	
2.2 Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles		Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	are	far	more	complicated	to	make	sense	of.		They	play	a	special	role	in	American	race	discourse,	due	to	presence	of	what	Tali	
Mendelberg	calls	the	Norm	of	Racial	Equality.		(Mendelberg	does	not	use	the	term	‘dogwhistle’	for	these,	though	later	writers	such	as	Ian	Haney	Lopez	2014	do.	She	simply	refers	to	‘implicit	political	communication’.)			Prior	to	the	1930s,	Mendelberg	argues	that	it	was	acceptable	to	explicitly	express	racist	attitudes	in	American	political	discourse.		More	specifically,	she	notes	that	it	was	acceptable	to	use	obviously	pejorative	terminology;	to	assert	that	black	people	are	innately	inferior	to	white	people;	and	to	express	support	for	legal	discrimination,	such	as	legally	enforced	segregation	or	refusal	to	hire	black	people.	Not	everyone	did	so,	of	course—but	doing	so	did	not	render	one	beyond	the	bounds	of	acceptable	political	engagement.		Those	courting	racist	voters	could	do	so	by	simply	proclaiming	their	racist	views.	From	the	1930s	to	the	1960s,	according	to	Mendelberg,	the	prevailing	norm	of	racial	inequality	“began	to	erode”	(Mendelberg	67).	After	the	1960s,	however,	this	became	increasingly	unacceptable.		Most	voters	now	no	longer	wanted	to	think	of	themselves	as	racist.				However,	it	remained	the	case	that	large	numbers	of	white	voters	displayed	high	levels	of	what	psychologists	call	“racial	resentment”	toward	black	people.		White	voters	are	highly	unlikely	to	endorse	claims	of	innate	black	inferiority.		However,	a	belief	system	that	psychologists	have	called	‘racial	resentment’4	remains	widespread.		Racial	resentment	includes	four	main	claims:	“blacks	no	longer	face	much	discrimination,	(2)	their	disadvantage	mainly	reflects	their	poor	work	ethic,	(3)	they	are	demanding	too	much	too	fast,	(4)	they	have	gotten	more	than	they	deserve.”	(Tesler	and	Sears	2010:	18,	citing	Henry	and	Sears	2002,	2005.)		Psychologists	standardly	test	for	racial	resentment	by	asking	for	degree	of	agreement	or	disagreement	with	the	following	statements	(Tesler	and	Sears	2010:	19):	
• Irish,	Italian,	Jewish	and	many	other	minorities	overcame	prejudice	and	worked	their	way	up.	Blacks	should	do	the	same	without	any	special	favours.																																																									4	Tesler	and	Sears,	who	I	quote	below,	use	the	term	‘symbolic	racism’,	but	they	note	that	they	use	it	interchangeably	with	Mendelberg’s	preferred	term,	‘racial	resentment’.	
• Generations	of	slavery	and	discrimination	have	created	conditions	that	make	it	difficult	for	blacks	to	work	their	way	out	of	the	lower	class.	
• Over	the	past	few	years,	blacks	have	gotten	less	than	they	deserve.	
• It’s	really	a	matter	of	some	people	not	trying	hard	enough;	if	blacks	would	only	try	harder	they	could	be	just	as	well	off	as	whites.	The	various	possible	responses	are	assigned	scores	on	a	score	ranging	from		most	racially	liberal	to	most	racially	conservative.	White	Americans	are,	overall,	on	the	racially	conservative	end	of	the	spectrum,	and	Republicans	significantly	more	so	than	Democrats.		Mendelberg	describes	this	situation	as	one	in	which	a	“norm	of	racial	equality”	is	in	place,	despite	the	persistence	of	racial	resentment.	Her	phrasing	may	be	somewhat	misleading,	however.		It	seems	to	me	certainly	not	the	case	that	the	majority	of	white	Americans	assent	to	any	very	strong	notion	of	racial	equality,	if	they	give	the	answers	that	count	as	racially	resentful	on	the	above	items.		Moreover,	it	is	clearly	still	quite	socially	acceptable	to	make	reference	to	the	ills	of	black	culture,	blaming	black	poverty	and	even	police	killings	of	unarmed	black	people	on	this	cause.	What	Mendelberg	calls	the	‘norm	of	racial	equality”	clearly	doesn’t	preclude	these	sorts	of	utterances.		Indeed,	she	herself	notes	a	tendency	to	conform	to	the	norm	“in	the	most	minimal,	symbolic	way	possible”	(Mendelberg	2001:	92).		One	plausible	way	of	understanding	this	is	that	white	Americans	feel	the	need	to	pay	lip	service	to	something	that	could	be	called	“racial	equality”.		Exactly	what	this	comes	to	may	vary	somewhat,	but	it	seems	to	preclude	the	use	of	obvious	pejoratives,	assertions	of	genetic	(though	not	cultural)	inferiority,	and	support	for	obviously	discriminatory	behavior	(legally	enforced	segregation,	rules	against	hiring	black	people,	etc).		The	only	kind	of	racial	equality	this	commits	one	to	is	an	extremely	thin	sort	of	formal	equality.		But	Mendelberg	is	clearly	right	that	the	bounds	of	permissible	racial	discourse	have	shifted	somewhat,	even	if	they	do	not	yet	require	support	for	any	
substantive	sort	of	equality.5		Despite	these	reservations	about	terminology	we	will	follow	Mendelberg	and	refer	to	the	current	situation	as	one	in	which	the	Norm	of	Racial	Equality	is	in	force.		Politicians	who	might	in	a	different	era	have	explicitly	expressed	obviously	racist	views	in	order	to	reach	proudly	racist	voters	now	need	to	find	a	subtler	way	to	signal	a	kind	of	psychological	kinship	with	these	“racially	resentful”	voters.6			An	explicit	racist	dogwhistle	wouldn’t	work—while	it	would	improve	on	an	unambiguously	racist	utterance,	it	would	still	be	recognized	as	racist	by	its	intended	audience.		And	most	of	this	audience	would	reject	something	that	was	explicitly	and	unambiguously	racist—doing	otherwise	would	call	into	question	their	now-cherished	commitment	to	egalitarianism.		(Importantly,	of	course,	not	everyone	would	reject	explicit	racism.		But	our	focus	here	is	on	the	large	segment	of	the	population	that	would.)		An	implicit	dogwhistle,	however,	could	do	the	job.		Such	an	utterance	would	appear	on	its	face	to	be	innocuous	and	unrelated	to	race—lending	deniability	if	confronted	with	racism	accusations.		And,	if	the	dogwhistled	content	could	do	its	work	outside	the	dogwhistle-audience’s	awareness,	it	would	not	be	rejected	in	the	way	that	an	explicitly	racist	dogwhistle	would	be.		But	how	could	a	dogwhistle	work	in	this	way?		How	can	a	racist	message	be	communicated	effectively	enough	to	influence	an	audience’s	voting	decisions,	without	the	audience	being	aware	of	it?		Working	through	examples	will	help	us	to	see	this.																																																									5	It	is	also	worth	noting,	and	exploring	at	a	different	time,	that	many	white	Americans	have	come	to	think	of	themselves	as	victims	of	racial	discrimination,	and	to	openly	assert	this	(Lopez,	citing	Greenberg:	71).	This	may	be	another	way	that	racial	resentment	can	be	expressed	without	violating	the	Norm	of	Racial	Equality:	those	who	express	this	view	would	claim	that	they	support	equality,	but	that	they	(not	black	Americans)	are	the	ones	being	treated	less	well.	6	Which	utterances	are	obviously	racist	is	obviously	a	matter	on	which	disagreement	arises.		It	seems	to	me	that	assertions	of	black	cultural	inferiority	are	obviously	racist,	but	it	is	clear	that	for	many	white	people	these	are	not	obviously	racist.		But	as	noted,	these	have	survived	the	presence	of	the	“norm	of	racial	equality”.	
		
2.2.1 Willie	Horton	The	most	famous	example	of	an	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle	is	the	immensely	successful	Willie	Horton	ad,	used	in	George	H.	W.	Bush’s	campaign	against	Michael	Dukakis.		(I	take	my	discussion	of	this	from	Mendelberg,	Chapters	5-8.)		This	ad	criticized	the	prison	furlough	programme	that	was	in	place	during	Dukakis’s	time	as	governor	by	telling	the	tale	of	a	furloughed	convict,	Willie	Horton.		Horton	assaulted	a	couple	in	their	home,	raping	the	woman	and	stabbing	the	man.		Race	is	not	mentioned	at	any	point	in	the	ad.		However,	the	illustration	for	the	ad	is	a	photo	of	Willie	Horton,	and	Horton	is	black.		The	Bush	campaign	made	Horton	a	key	issue,	and	this	led	to	the	ad	receiving	enormous	airplay	on	the	news.		Prior	to	the	Willie	Horton	ad,	Dukakis	was	substantially	ahead	in	the	opinion	polls.		As	the	ad	aired	and	was	discussed,	he	immediately	began	to	plummet.		During	most	of	this	time,	the	ad	was	not	discussed	in	connection	with	race.		It	was	discussed	as	a	part	of	stories	on	the	role	of	crime	in	the	campaign,	or	negative	campaigning.		However,	quite	late,	Jesse	Jackson	called	the	Willie	Horton	ad	“racist”.		This	charge	was	at	the	time	viewed	with	great	skepticism	(though	it’s	extremely	widely	accepted	now),	and	viewed	as	an	illicit	attempt	by	Democrats	to	“play	the	race	card”.		But	it	was	widely	discussed.		As	soon	as	the	possibility	of	racism	was	raised,	the	ad	ceased	to	function	wholly	on	an	implicit	level.		Viewers	began	to	consider	the	possibility	that	something	racial	might	be	going	on.		And	at	this	point,	Dukakis	started	to	rise	in	the	polls	again—some	indication	that	the	ad	had	ceased	to	be	effective	once	race	was	explicitly	under	discussion.			But	of	course,	none	of	this	really	shows	that	the	ad	was	responsible	for	these	effects,	or	that	race	had	anything	to	do	with	it	(though	the	effect	of	the	Jackson	intervention	is	suggestive.)		Far	more	informative	is	the	data	gathered	during	the	campaign	about	the	effects	on	voters.		These	data	show	that	while	levels	of	racial	
resentment	were	unaffected	by	viewing	the	ad,	the	relationship	between	racial	
resentment	and	voting	intentions	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	ad.		Specifically,	increasing	exposure	to	the	ad	increased	the	likelihood	of	racially	resentful	voters	favouring	Bush.	And,	crucially,	as	soon	as	Jackson	criticized	the	ad	as	racist,	this	correlation	began	to	decline.				Mendelberg	argues	that	the	dogwhistle	acts	upon	pre-existing	racial	attitudes,	unconsciously	bringing	them	to	bear	where	they	might	previously	not	have	been	drawn	upon—in	this	case	on	voting	preferences.		But	she	also	notes	something	else	that	is	vital:	once	race	starts	to	be	consciously	reflected	on,	the	dogwhistle	ceases	to	be	fully	implicit.		This	drastically	diminishes	its	effectiveness,	presumably	due	to	the	widespread	conscious	acceptance	of	the	norm	of	racial	equality.	As	Mendelberg	writes,	“As	soon	as	a	person	is	alerted	to	the	need	to	pay	conscious	attention	to	her	response,	accessibility	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	make	her	rely	upon	racial	predispositions”	(Mendelberg	2001:	210).	Mendelberg’s	experimental	data	back	this	up,	showing	a	sizable	relationship	between	racial	resentment	and	policy	preferences	after	viewing	an	implicitly	racial	ad,	but	no	relationship	after	viewing	an	explicitly	racial	ad	(Chapter	7).	
2.2.2 ‘Inner	City’		In	the	United	States,	‘inner	city’	has	come	to	function	as	a	dogwhistle	for	black.		Thus,	politicians	who	would	be	rebuked	if	they	called	for	harsher	measures	against	black	criminals	can	safely	call	for	cracking	down	on	inner	city	crime.		Psychologists	have	studied	the	effects	of	the	phrase	“inner	city”,	and	it	seems	to	function	very	similarly	to	the	Willie	Horton	ad.	Horwitz	and	Peffley	(2005)	randomly	assigned	subjects	to	two	groups,	with	one	group	being	asked	question	A	below,	and	one	group	being	asked	question	B	(difference	underlined	by	me,	from	102-3).		 A. Some	people	want	to	increase	spending	for	new	prisons	to	lock	up	violent	criminals.	Other	people	would	rather	spend	this	money	for	antipoverty	programs	to	prevent	crime.	What	about	you?	If	you	had	to	choose,	would	
you	rather	see	this	money	spent	on	building	new	prisons,	or	on	antipoverty	programs?	B. Some	people	want	to	increase	spending	for	new	prisons	to	lock	up	violent	inner	city	criminals.	Other	people	would	rather	spend	this	money	for	antipoverty	programs	to	prevent	crime.	What	about	you?	If	you	had	to	choose,	would	you	rather	see	this	money	spent	on	building	new	prisons,	or	on	antipoverty	programs?		This	small	change—the	addition	of	‘inner	city’—turned	out	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	answer	that	subjects	gave,	but	the	nature	of	this	effect	was	strongly	influenced	by	subjects’	pre-existing	racial	attitudes.		Prior	to	being	asked	A	or	B	above,	subjects	were	questioned	about	their	acceptance	of	racial	stereotypes	and	their	beliefs	regarding	the	racial	fairness	of	the	justice	system.		“Racial	conservatives”	tended	to	hold	negative	stereotypes	of	black	people	and	to	believe	the	system	to	be	racially	fair.		“Racial	liberals”	were	the	opposite.				When	‘inner	city’	was	added	to	the	question	(as	in	B)	subjects’	attitudes	toward	spending	were	strongly	influenced	by	their	pre-existing	racial	attitudes—with	racial	conservatives	more	likely	to	favour	prison	spending	and	racial	liberals	more	likely	to	oppose	it.		But	when	‘inner	city’	was	not	present	(as	in	A)	there	was	no	relationship	between	racial	attitudes	and	answers	to	the	question.		This	shows	that	‘inner	city’	serves	to	raise	subjects’	pre-existing	racial	attitudes	to	salience	and	bring	them	to	bear	on	a	question,	where	they	would	not	otherwise	be	brought	to	bear—just	as	the	Willie	Horton	ad	does.7						 3. Unintentional	Dogwhistles																																																									7	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	effect	on	racial	liberals	was	due	to	implicit	or	explicit	processes.		It	is	possible	that	racial	liberals	reflected	explicitly	on	the	use	of	‘inner	city’	as	a	euphemism	for	‘black’,	rather	than	simply	having	their	racial	attitudes	raised	to	non-conscious	salience.		In	general,	racial	liberals	have	not	been	the	focus	of	studies	on	racial	priming	and	dogwhistles.		Many	thanks	to	Rosie	Worsdale	for	raising	this	point.	
	Thus	far,	our	focus	has	been	on	intentional	dogwhistles.	However,	a	crucial	fact	about	the	way	that	dogwhistles	function	and	do	their	work	in	the	world	is	the	way	in	which	they	can	be	unintentionally	passed	on,	with	identical	effects	to	the	original	dogwhistle.		This	is	wholly	predictable,	from	the	fact	that	audiences	will	very	often	be	unaware	of	a	dogwhistle’s	presence—they	may,	and	do,	repeat	the	dogwhistle	unwittingly.		I	will	call	these	utterances	unintentional	dogwhistles,	and	in	this	section	of	the	paper	we	will	work	through	a	few	examples.	My	working	definition	of	‘unintentional	dogwhistle’	will	be	as	follows:	Unwitting	use	of	words	and/or	images	that,	used	intentionally,	constitute	an	intentional	dogwhistle,	where	this	use	has	the	same	effect	as	an	intentional	dogwhistle.	To	see	that	this	is	possible,	just	reflect	briefly	on	the	Dred	Scott	dogwhistle	that	we’ve	already	discussed.		Now	imagine	a	debate,	in	which	the	left-wing	candidate	is	puzzled	by	the	right-wing	candidate	expressing	their	opposition	to	Dred	Scott:	they	had	not	taken	slavery	to	be	a	live	issue,	and	they	are	unaware	of	the	dogwhistle.		Confused,	they	become	worried	that	they	might	be	taken	to	support	slavery	if	they	do	not	also	start	expressing	their	opposition	to	Dred	Scott—so	they,	too,	start	waxing	eloquent	on	the	wrongness	of	this	decision.		But	since	discussing	Dred	Scott	dogwhistles	opposition	to	abortion	they	unintentionally	(and	falsely)	dogwhistle	their	opposition	to	abortion.		Very	importantly,	though,	we	don’t	need	to	rely	on	fanciful	cases	like	this.		Secondary	dogwhistles	are	real,	and	they	are	in	fact	often	a	part	of	the	primary	dogwhistlers’	plan.		
3.1	Barry	Goldwater		Barry	Goldwater,	the	1964	Republican	nominee	for	President,	gives	us	a	fascinating	case	of	a	secondary	dogwhistle.		(Here	I	again	draw	heavily	on	Mendelberg,	84-88.)	Goldwater	was,	for	his	time	and	definitely	for	his	party,	relatively	on	the	left	when	it	came	to	issues	of	race.		He	was	a	founding	member	
of	the	Arizona	NAACP,	an	important	civil	rights	organization.8		However,	he	was	first	and	foremost	a	libertarian	and	opponent	of	federal	interference	in	(what	he	took	to	be)	state	matters.		This	is	what	led	him	to	vote	against	the	landmark	Civil	Rights	Act	in	1964.		(He	spoke	in	favour	of	its	goals,	but	against	using	the	federal	government	to	implement	these	goals.)		All	this	placed	Goldwater	in	a	delicate	position	politically:	to	win	the	South,	he	needed	to	convince	racist	voters	that	he	shared	their	views.		But	he	was	unwilling	to	spend	much	time	discussing	race.		His	handlers	found	an	excellent	solution.		A	part	of	the	solution	was	to	take	his	one	speech	about	the	Civil	Rights	Act	and	try	to	give	it	as	much	visibility	as	they	could.		But	from	our	perspective	the	more	interesting	solution	involved	Goldwater’s	advocacy	of	“states’	rights”.		In	the	United	States,	there	is	always	a	balance	to	be	struck	between	federal	laws	and	the	quite	substantial	autonomy	granted	to	states.		There	are	disagreements	over	exactly	how	to	strike	this	balance.		Those	who	advocate	more	autonomy	for	states	are	proponents	of	“states	rights”.	But	this	is	not	the	full	story.		“States’	rights”	has	come	to	function	as	a	dogwhistle	in	the	American	South	because	of	the	idea’s	role	in	struggles	over	race	and	racism.		During	(and	before)	the	Civil	War,	the	slave-holding	states	insisted	that	they	should	be	allowed	to	maintain	the	institution	of	slavery	because	whether	or	not	to	do	so	was	a	matter	that	states,	not	the	federal	government,	should	decide.		And	during	the	battle	against	legally	mandated	racial	segregation,	the	segregationist	states	argued	that	it	was	their	right,	as	states,	to	decide	whether	or	not	to	integrate.	This	history	has	made	the	phrase	“states’	rights”	a	potent	dogwhistle	in	the	South.	Since	Goldwater	happily	gave	many	speeches	on	the	importance	of	states’	rights—in	his	case	motivated	more	by	libertarianism	than	by	racism—his	handlers	had	many	utterances	they	could	play	out	of	context	in	the	South	to	dogwhistle	opposition	to	integration.		These	replayings,	it	seems	to	me,	were	unintentional	dogwhistles.		
																																																								8	http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-barry-goldwaters-warning-to-the-gop/2014/04/17/9e8993ec-c651-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html	
3.2		Willie	Horton	and	the	Reporters	There	is	by	now	ample	evidence	that	the	Bush	campaign	was	deliberately	dogwhistling	about	race	with	the	Willie	Horton	ad.		However,	there	is	no	reason	to	believe	that	the	reporters	and	TV	producers	of	the	time	were	doing	this.		Certainly	some	may	have	been,	but	many	were	not.		Yet	nonetheless	they	replayed	the	ad	over	and	over,	and	discussed	Horton	and	his	crimes	over	and	over	in	the	context	of	the	election.		This,	in	fact,	was	what	allowed	the	effects	Mendelberg	discusses	to	be	so	widespread	and	so	powerful:	the	original	advertisement	was	only	shown	briefly	in	a	small	area,	but	it	was	re-shown	again	and	again	as	a	part	of	news	reports	ostensibly	about	“negative	campaigning”	or	“crime”.		I	take	these	re-showings	to	be	unintentional	dogwhistles.		This	shows	just	how	important	such	unintentional	dogwhistles	can	be	in	accomplishing	an	intentional	dogwhistle’s	goals.		Indeed,	such	is	their	importance	that	they	deserve	a	term	of	their	own.	I	will	call	these	‘amplifier	dogwhistles’,	since	they	greatly	increase	the	reach	of	the	original	dogwhistle.		And,	just	as	an	amplifier	is	not	responsible	for	the	original	sound	that	it	amplifies,	those	who	carry	out	acts	of	amplifier	dogwhistling	will	are	not	be	responsible	for	the	original	dogwhistle	whose	reach	they	are	enhancing.			
3.3	Racialisation	of	‘government	spending’	Throughout	the	1980s,	a	converted	effort	was	made	by	the	Republican	Party	in	the	US	to	associate	government	spending	with	racial	minorities.		(Ronald	Reagan	was	especially	important	to	this	campaign.)		This	effort	was	enormously	successful:	Media	coverage	of	government	assistance,	for	example,	came	to	focus	disproportionately	on	black	recipients	of	assistance,	despite	the	fact	that	they	are	the	minority	of	those	on	such	assistance	(Valentino	et.	al.	75).				And,	we	will	see,	these	efforts	have	brought	it	about	that	even	terms	like	‘government	spending’	now	serve	as	racial	dogwhistles.		Utterances	containing	such	terms	are,	as	a	result,	sometimes	intentional	dogwhistles—when	the	utterances	are	made	with	the	intention	of	making	racial	attitudes	salient.		But	these	terms	are	widely	used,	as	what	the	country	should	spend	money	on	is	an	issue	that	simply	has	to	be	
discussed.		And	so	they	will	extremely	often	function	as	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles.	Indeed,	they	will	often	serve	as	amplifier	dogwhistles.		We’ll	begin	by	examining	the	evidence	that	utterances	of	these	words	can	function	as	implicit	racial	dogwhistles.		We	can	see	very	clearly	that	this	is	the	case	from	Valentino	et.	al.’s	study	of	racial	priming	and	political	advertising.		Their	study	involves	showing	participants	one	of	several	versions	of	a	carefully	constructed	advertisement.		In	every	version,	the	words	of	the	advertisement,	ostensibly	for	George	W.	Bush,	criticizes	Democrats	for	“wasteful	spending”	and	says	(to	take	one	example	from	a	complex	ad)	that	Bush	will	“reform	an	unfair	system	that	only	provides	healthcare	for	some,	while	others	go	without”	(79).		What	varies	across	versions	is	the	visuals.		One	version,	Neutral,	uses	wholly	neutral	visuals,	like	medical	files	and	the	Statue	of	Liberty.		The	second,	Race	Comparison,	uses	images	of	e.g.	a	black	family	being	helped	while	the	words	“healthcare	for	some”	are	uttered;	and	images	of	a	white	mother	and	child	while	the	words	“others	go	without”	are	uttered.		The	third,	Undeserving	Blacks,	does	not	contain	images	comparing	treatment	of	whites	and	blacks,	but	does	show	images	designed	trigger	associations	of	race	and	government	spending.		So,	it	shows	the	black	family	being	helped	just	as	in	Race	Comparison;	but	it	shows	medical	files	while	“others	go	without”	are	uttered.	A	control	group	viewed	a	totally	non-political	advertisement.		After	viewing	the	advertisements,	subjects	completed	a	test	to	assess	the	accessibility	of	racial	attitudes.		They	then	completed	a	questionnaire	regarding	their	assessment	of	presidential	candidates,	the	importance	of	various	issues,	and	their	racial	and	political	attitudes.		Below	is	a	table	(Valentino	and	Hutchings:	79)	showing	the	workings	of	the	various	versions	of	the	advertisement.		 	
TABLE 1. Transcripts of Implicit Race Cue Advertising 
Manipulation 
Narrative	 Neutral	Visuals	 Race	Comparison	 Undeserving	
Blacks	
George	W.	Bush,	
dedicated	to	
building	an	
America	with	
strong	values	
George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands	 George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands	 George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands	
Democrats	want	to	
spend	your	tax	
dollars	on	wasteful	
government	
programs,	but	
George	W.	Bush	
will	cut	taxes	
because	you	know	
best	how	to	spend	
the	money	you	
earn.	
Image	of	Statue	of	Liberty,	Treasury	Building	Bush	sitting	on	couch,	residential	street	(no	people)	
Black	person	
counting	money,	
black	mother	
and	child	in	
office	Bush	sitting	on	couch,	white	
person	writing	
check,	white	
person	counting	
money,	white	
teacher	
Black	person	
counting	money,	
black	mother	
and	child	in	
office	Bush	sitting	on	couch,	residential	street	(no	people)	
Governor	Bush	
cares	about	
families.	
Laboratory	workers	(race	unclear)	looking	into	microscopes	
White	parents	
walking	with	
child	 Residential	street	(shot	continued	as	above)	
He’ll	reform	an	
unfair	system	that	
only	provides	
health	care	for	
some,	while	others	
go	without	proper	
treatment	because	
their	employer	
can’t	afford	it.	
Medical	files	 White	nurse	
assisting	black	
mother,	child	
White	mother	
holding	child	
White	nurse	
assisting	black	
mother,	child	Medical	files	
When	he’s	
president,	every	
hard-working	
American	will	
have	affordable,	
high-quality	
health	care.	
X-rays	against	lit	background	 Bush	talking	to	white	family,	
talking	to	white	
child,	Bush	
kissing	white	girl	
X-rays	against	lit	background	
George	W.	Bush,	a	
fresh	start	for	
America	
Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	and	“A	Fresh	Start”	
Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	and	“A	Fresh	Start”	
Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	and	“A	Fresh	Start”	
Valentino	et.	al.	found	that	racial	resentment	had	little	effect	on	preference	between	candidates	unless	subjects	had	viewed	one	of	the	political	advertisements.		But	if	they	had	viewed	one	of	the	political	advertisements,	the	impact	of	racial	resentment	on	candidate	preference	was	increased—even	in	the	neutral	condition	in	which	the	advertisement	contained	no	racialised	imagery,	just	words	about	government	spending.		Indeed,	the	effect	in	the	Neutral	Condition	was	just	as	strong	as	in	the	Race	Comparison	condition	(though	less	strong	than	in	the	Undeserving	Blacks	condition).		This	shows	very	clearly	that	“government	spending”	has	become	an	implicit	dogwhistle,	which	functions	like	the	Willie	Horton	ad	or	“inner	city”.		And	this	fact	should	be	enormously	disconcerting,	as	it	indicates	just	how	very	widespread	such	priming	is.		The	widespread	nature	of	such	priming	makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	discuss	issues	absolutely	central	to	democracy—such	as	what	a	government	should	spend	its	money	on—without	opinions	being	influenced	by	racial	attitudes.9				Importantly,	Valentino	et.	al.	also	tested	the	impact	of	counter-stereotypical	
images.				In	these	versions	of	the	advertisement,	the	images	of	black	families	appear	as	the	ad	discusses	“hard-working	families”,	and	so	on.		These	ads	are	designed	to	jar	with	the	racist	stereotypes	that	viewers	have	likely	absorbed	through	cultural	exposure.		The	effects	were	dramatic.	
When the black racial cues are stereotype-inconsistent, however, the 
relationship between racial attitudes and the vote disappears... Violating 
racial stereotypes with positive images of blacks dramatically 
undermines racial priming. The presence of black images alone, 
therefore, does not prime negative racial attitudes. The effect emerges 
only when the pairing of the visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces 
negative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer. 
This is a crucial point, as it raises another possible way of combatting the 
influence of implicit dogwhistles.  It shows that it is possible to discuss 
government spending without priming racial attitudes.  But avoiding racial 
imagery is not the way to do this—instead, one must make a concerted effort to 
include the right racial imagery.  The right racial imagery will be 
counterstereotypical imagery that can serve to undermine the dogwhistles 																																																								9	This	sort	of	concern	is	very	important	to	Stanley	(2015).	
(primary or secondary) that would otherwise be present (whatever one’s 
intentions).  This requires awareness and effort on the part of the speaker, who 
might otherwise think that they have avoided triggering racial attitudes by 
avoiding overtly racial imagery or words.  (See the table below, from Valentino 
and Hutchings: 80) 
  
 Table	2.	Transcripts	of	Counter-Stereotypic	Advertising	
Manipulation	
Narrative	 Deserving	Blacks	 Deserving	
Whites	
Undeserving	
Whites	
George	W.	Bush,	
dedicated	to	building	
an	America	with	
strong	values.	
George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands,	black	woman	with	American	flag	in	background,	black	veteran	smiling	
George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands	 George	Bush	in	crowd	shaking	hands	
Democrats	want	to	
spend	your	tax	
dollars	on	wasteful	
government	
programs,	but	George	
W.	Bush	will	cut	taxes	
because	you	know	
best	how	to	spend	the	
money	you	earn.	
Treasury	building	Bush	sitting	on	couch,	black	
person	laying	
money	on	a	
counter	
Bush	sitting	on	couch,	white	
person	writing	a	
check,	white	
person	counting	
money	
White	person	
counting	money,	
white	mother	
and	child	in	
office	Bush	sitting	on	couch,	residential	street	(no	people)	
Governor	Bush	cares	
about	families.	
Black	family	using	
a	computer,	black	
family	eating	at	a	
restaurant	
White	teacher,	
white	parents	
walking	with	
child	
Residential	street	(shot	continued	as	above)	
He’ll	reform	an	unfair	
system	that	only	
provides	health	care	
for	some,	while	others	
go	without	proper	
treatment	because	
their	employer	can’t	
afford	it.	
Laboratory	workers	(race	unclear)	looking	into	microscopes	
Black	women	
holding	baby	
Laboratory	workers	(race	unclear)	looking	into	microscopes	
White	mother	
holding	child	
White	mother	
holding	
newborn	
receiving	
medical	care	in	
hospital	Medical	files	
When	he’s	president,	
every	hard-working	
American	will	have	
affordable,	high-
quality	health	care.	
Bush	shaking	
hands	with	black	
children,	black	
kids	sitting	in	
school	yard,	Bush	
sitting	in	
classroom	reading	
with	black	kids	
Bush	talking	to	
white	family,	
Bush	talking	to	
white	child,	Bush	
kissing	white	
girl		
X-rays	against	lit	background	
George	W.	Bush,	a	
fresh	start	for	
America	
Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	 Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	 Bush,	arm	around	wife.	Screen	reads	“George	W.	Bush”	
and	“A	Fresh	Start”	 and	“A	Fresh	Start”	 and	“A	Fresh	Start”	
4. Why	Existing	Accounts	Cannot	Fully	Capture		
4.1	What	existing	accounts	can	capture	Existing	accounts	do	fairly	well	with	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle.		As	noted	in	the	discussion	above,	it	is	quite	plausible	to	suppose	that	‘Dred	Scott’	utterances	carry	conversational	implicatures	about	opposition	to	abortion.			Elisabeth	Camp	(2013)	goes	a	step	further	and	introduces	the	notion	of	
insinuation.		A	speaker	insinuates	some	proposition	P	just	in	case	she	communicates	P	without	entering	P	into	the	conversational	record.	The	speaker	intends	her	intention	to	be	recognised,	but	without	a	willingness	or	responsibility	to	own	up	to	it.10	This	is	an	important	notion.		
“Intuitively, the whole point of insinuation – what defines it and makes it 
rhetorically useful – is that it involves off-record communication: the speaker 
means (and when successful, communicates) something without putting it on 
the conversational record. If this is right, then the very existence of insinuation 
demonstrates that we can’t simply equate what a speaker means with her 
utterance’s contribution to the conversational score or record.” (REF) Camp	treats	Bush’s	Dred	Scott	dogwhistle	as	a	paradigm	case	of	insinuation,	and	this	seems	plausible.	Bush	intends	to	have	his	anti-abortion	message	recognized,	and	recognized	as	intended.		At	the	same	time,	though,	use	of	a	code	phrase	gives	allows	him	to	avoid	placing	his	contribution	on	the	record—thus	achieving	deniability.		
4.2		More	difficult	cases	Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	are	substantially	more	challenging	to	capture.		There	are	two	key	reasons	for	this.		First,	what	is	dogwhistled	is	not																																																									10	Camp	describes	this	as	‘implicit’	communication.		This	is	clearly	a	different	usage	from	Mendelberg’s,	as	Camp	is	interested	in	cases	in	which	at	least	part	of	the	audience	recognizes	the	speaker’s	intention,	and	is	expected	to	do	so.	
a	particular	proposition.		Instead,	certain	pre-existing	attitudes	are	brought	to	salience.			This	means	that	any	theory	relying	on	the	communication	(via	semantics	or	pragmatics)	of	a	particular	proposition	will	fail.	Second,	this	occurs	outside	of	consciousness.		Crucially,	when	an	audience	becomes	conscious	of	the	dogwhistle,	it	fails	to	achieve	its	intended	effect.		Success	of	an	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle,	then—unlike	most	communicative	acts—depends	on	the	audience	not	recognizing	the	speaker’s	intention.		Any	theory	which	includes	the	idea	that	uptake	(recognition	of	the	speaker’s	intention)	is	required	for	success	will	fail	entirely	as	a	way	of	accommodating	implicit	dogwhistles.		Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	only	succeed	where	uptake	is	absent;	uptake	prevents	such	dogwhistles	from	being	effective.11				Two	sorts	of	theories,	however,	hold	out	some	promise	for	capturing	them:	Langton	and	McGowan’s	work	on	conversational	accommodation,	especially	McGowan’s	notion	of	conversational	exercitives;	and	Jason	Stanley’s	recent	work	on	propaganda	and	not-at-issue	content.		We	will	see,	however,	that	neither	of	these	is	fully	able	to	capture	the	complexity	of	these	cases.		
4.2.1 Stanley		Jason	Stanley	is	the	only	philosopher	to	have	discussed	what	I	call	‘implicit	dogwhistles’	(both	intentional	and	unintentional),	which	he	takes	to	be	a	particularly	insidious	form	of	propaganda.			On	Stanley’s	view,	these	function	by	introducing	into	conversation	some	pernicious	“not-at-issue”	effects.		Not-at-issue	content	is	material	that	becomes	part	of	the	conversation’s	common	ground	without	being	explicitly	put	up	for	consideration	in	the	way	that	asserted	content	is.		This	makes	it	more	difficult	to	notice	that	this	content	is	being	added	to	the	common	ground,	and	also	more	difficult	to	object	to.		It	also	cannot	be	canceled	(Stanley:	139).		Stanley	argues	that	certain	words	come	to	carry	not-at-issue	content	of	a	highly	problematic	sort:	 																																																								11	Dogwhistles	are	not	alone	in	having	this	latter	feature.		Most	acts	of	deception	are	also	like	this:	if	the	audience	recognizes	the	speaker’s	intention	to	deceive	the	deception	fails.	
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When the news media connects images of urban Blacks repeatedly with 
mentions of the term “welfare,” the term “welfare” comes to have not-at-issue 
content that Blacks are lazy. (Stanley: 138) 
Stanley also suggests that the not-at-issue effect of a term can take the form of a 
preference ordering, taking the form of a ranking of groups in terms of worthiness 
of respect.  So, a term may cause those who encounter it to rank groups 
differently, in a way that erodes respect for some groups. One might even come to 
rank groups as worthy of more or less empathy, which for Stanley is an especially 
important sort of not-at-issue effect. 
 
Stanley’s approach is able to accommodate the way that audiences may be 
unaware of what is really going on in an implicit dogwhistle utterance.  Not-at-
issue content is (sometimes) entered into the common ground without an 
audience’s explicit awareness that this is taking place: this is a key part of what 
makes it so insidious. 
 
Nonetheless, Stanley’s approach does not accommodate all that psychologists 
have taught us about how these utterances work.  Stanley suggests that words like 
‘welfare’ erode respect for black people either by carrying a not-at-issue content 
that black people are lazy or causing people to implement a preference ranking 
according to which black people are less deserving of empathy than white people 
are.  Moreover, he suggests that this cannot be cancelled, and that it will be 
present in every use of a term like ‘welfare’.12  But this fails to fit with the data in 
certain key ways.   
 
The first problem is that the use of implicit dogwhistle terms like ‘welfare’ or 
even the viewing of advertisements like the Willie Horton ads do not (in general) 
cause changes in racial attitudes.13  Instead, they make accessible pre-existing 																																																								12	He	does	allow	for	the	possibility	of	change	over	time,	but	only	when	there	is	“sufficient	control	of	the	media	and	other	instruments	of	power”	(162)	by	those	advocating	a	change.		He	does	not	allow	for	conversation-by-conversation	variation.	13	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	the	worry	I	am	raising	here	is	specific	to	the	claim	that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	changes	in	racial	attitudes,	based	on	specific	study	of	these	utterances.		I	am	not	at	all	skeptical	about	the	general	idea	of	linguistic	
attitudes, and bring them to bear on issues where they might not otherwise have 
played a role in decision-making. This is quite different from Stanley’s picture, on 
which the terms either cause new claims to be added to the common ground, or 
cause changes in people’s preference rankings14.   
 
The second problem is related to this one.  It is that the effects of implicit 
dogwhistle terms are not quite so monolithically negative as Stanley takes them to 
be.  We can see this either intuitively or by looking at the empirical evidence.  
Intuitively, we can imagine a black speaker addressing a left-wing black audience 
and saying “My mother was on welfare while she did the engineering degree that 
lifted our family out of poverty”.  This use of ‘welfare’ will not carry any 
suggestion that black people are lazy, nor will it erode respect for black people.  If 
we prefer to look back on the empirical data, we can return to the findings 
discussed earlier.  Adding  ‘inner city’ to the question about prison funding caused 
those low in racial resentment to be less likely to agree that more prisons should 
be built.  Pre-existing racial attitudes—whatever they are—are activated by 
implicit racial dogwhistle terms.  If the attitudes are racially resentful, then there is 
likely to be an outcome that indeed fits with a lack of respect for black people.  
But if the attitudes are not racially resentful, the outcome is likely to be entirely 
different. 
 
Finally, challenging a dogwhistle successfully may not be as difficult as Stanley 
suggests.  The priming of racial resentment only works if it remains implicit.  If a 
dogwhistle term like ‘welfare’ is used but race is made explicit, the effect 
vanishes.  Recall also that as soon as Jesse Jackson raised the issue of race, the 
																																																																																																																																																														utterances	causing	changes	in	attitudes—indeed	I	think	this	is	widespread.		Nor	am	I	even	sceptical	about	the	idea	that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	some	changes	in	attitudes:	After	all,	viewing	the	Willie	Horton	ad	caused	many	voters	to	change	their	voting	intentions	and	their	beliefs	about	who	was	the	best	candidate.	
14 Some of Stanley’s claims are also at odds with the idea that dogwhistles alter attitudes.  For example, 
he writes, “As Tali Mendelberg shows, stereotypes of black Americans have remained 
constant throughout the history of the Republic.” (135) 	
Willie Horton ad ceased to be effective. But the fact that it sometimes does shows 
that some challenges can succeed rather easily. 
 	
4.2.2		Langton	and	McGowan	Langton	(2012)	discusses	many	ways	that	hate	speech	might	function.		For	our	purposes	here	the	most	promising	is	one	based	on	Lewis	and	Stalnaker’s	work	on	conversational	score.		[Utterances	of	hate	speech]	may	implicitly	presuppose	certain	facts	and	norms,	rather	than	explicitly	enacting	them;	but	these	implicit	presuppositions	may	nonetheless	work	in	ways	that	are	comparable	to	classic	Austinian	illocutions.	Consumers	then	change	their	factual	and	normative	beliefs	by	taking	on	board	the	‘common	ground’	(in	Robert	Stalnaker’s	phrase)	or	the	‘conversational	score’	(in	David	Lewis’s	phrase)	that	is	presupposed	in	the…’conversation’.	(83)	Langton	further	suggests	that	emotions	like	desire	and	hate	may	be	introduced	into	the	common	ground	through	roughly	the	same	procedure—or,	in	Lewis’s	terms,	their	appropriateness	may	become	part	of	the	conversational	score.		Langton	tentatively	suggests	that	the	two	accounts	may	be	related	as	follows:	Lewis’s	account	captures	the	immediate	way	that	what	counts	as	acceptable	may	change,	and	this	then	leads	to	changes	in	the	attitudes	and	emotions	that	are	part	of	the	taken-for-granted	common	ground	of	the	conversation.			It	is	useful	to	understand	this	in	terms	of	Mary	Kate	McGowan’s	model	(2004,	2012).		McGowan	suggests	that	these	alterations	in	the	conversational	score	should	be	understood	as	due	to	covert	exercitives.		These	are	speech	acts	which	do	not	require	any	special	authority	on	the	part	of	the	speaker	(unlike	more	standard	exercitives	such	as	ruling	a	play	in	football	as	a	foul.)	Crucially,	they	may	or	may	not	be	intended	by	the	speaker	or	recognized	by	the	audience.		McGowan	suggests	that	these	acts	will	be	very	widespread	in	any	norm-governed	activity	(and	that	a	huge	variety	of	activities	are	norm-governed).		What	is	permissible	in	such	activities	depends	both	on	the	rules	(implicit	or	explicit)	of	those	activities,	and	on	what	has	happened	before.		In	a	conversation,	
what	is	permissible	adapts	quickly	and	seamlessly	in	response	to	what	people	say.		Suppose	Jeff	makes	an	utterance	that	carries	a	presupposition,	such	as	(1):	(1) Yes,	my	wife	and	I	like	to	do	that.	If	nobody	protests,	then	it	becomes	permissible	(in	this	context)	to	make	other	utterances	in	this	conversation	that	assume	that	Jeff	has	a	wife.				Similarly,	McGowan	suggests	that	if	Jeff	makes	a	racist	utterance	and	nobody	protests,	it	becomes	permissible	(in	this	context)	to	make	further	racist	utterances.		Depending	on	the	context	and	the	nature	of	the	utterance,	it	may	also	enact	further	racist	permissibility	facts	(McGowan	2012:	137-9).		The	most	appealing	elements	of	this	picture	for	dealing	with	implicit	dogwhistles	are	that	(a)	significant	changes	to	common	ground	or	to	score	may	occur	implicitly;	and	(b)	it	is	not	just	focused	on	propositions	believed	or	taken	for	granted,	but	also	on	norms	and	emotions.		The	suggestion	would	be,	then,	that	e.g.	the	Willie	Horton	ad	implicitly	alters	the	facts	about	what	it	is	appropriate	to	take	into	account	in	making	voting	decisions.		The	normative	score—regarding	what	one’s	voting	decisions	should	be	based	on—is	subtly	altered	by	the	Willie	Horton	ad,	outside	of	the	awareness	of	those	who	view	it.		This	leads	viewers	to	take	race	into	account	in	their	voting	decisions.		And	since	McGowan	allows	that	this	may	occur	unintentionally,	we	can	accommodate	both	intentional	and	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles.		 	At	first,	this	seems	like	a	very	good	fit.		However,	there	is	a	crucial	problem:	if	dogwhistles	were	actually	changing	permissibility	facts,	discussing	what	has	been	implicitly	added	would	not	destroy	their	effects	in	the	way	that	it	does.		When	Jesse	Jackson	raised	the	possibility	that	the	Willie	Horton	ads	were	related	to	race,	viewers	stopped	allowing	their	vote	to	be	influenced	by	their	racial	attitudes.		If	the	ad	actually	had	made	it	permissible	to	base	their	voting	decision	on	racial	attitudes,	this	would	not	have	happened.		When	we	reflect	on	something	that	we	genuinely	take	to	be	permissible,	we	don’t	reject	it—even	if	it’s	something	we	haven’t	reflected	on.		Imagine,	for	example,	that	I	am	immersed	in	a	country	with	different	conventions	about	personal	space,	and	I	take	on	those	
conventions	without	realizing	it.		If	someone	in	this	country	remarks	on	the	fact,	I	don’t	reject	it:	instead,	I	realize	that	the	permissibility	facts	have	changed	for	me,	at	least	for	the	duration	of	my	time	in	this	country.		When	one	calls	attention	to	a	racial	dogwhistle,	what	happens	is	very	different:	what	happens	looks,	for	all	the	world,	like	a	discovery	that	one	was	doing	something	impermissible.	This	shows	that	the	Langton/McGowan	story	cannot	capture	these	cases.		
4.2.3	Implicit	Intentional	Dogwhistles	as	covert	perlocutionary	speech	acts		My	view	is	that	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	must	be	understood	as	a	species	of	perlocutionary	speech	acts.		Perlocutionary	speech	acts	are	not	much	discussed	by	philosophers	of	language,	and	with	good	reason.		They	are	quite	a	motley	and	unsystematic	collection	of	acts,	difficult	to	theorise.		(Contrast	the	simple	illocutionary	act	of	getting	married	with	the	intended	perlocutionary	acts	of	being	happy,	making	one’s	ex	jealous,	getting	to	wear	that	lovely	dress,	acquiring	citizenship,	becoming	financially	secure;	and	the	unintended	perlocutionary	acts	of	making	one’s	parents	cry,	devastating	a	secret	admirer,	inspiring	some	friends	to	get	married,	and	so	on.)		However,	individual	kinds	of	perlocutionary	acts	can	be	extremely	important.		And	the	perlocutionary	seems	very	much	the	right	category	for	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	upon	brief	reflection:	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles,	after	all,	are	very	much	a	matter	of	intended	effects	on	their	audiences.		My	suggestion	is	that	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	should	be	understood	as	what	I	will	call	covert	perlocutionary	acts.		A	covert	perlocutionary	act	is	one	that	does	not	succeed	if	the	intended	perlocutionary	effect	is	recognized	as	intended.		Although	this	category	has	not	been	much	discussed	as	a	category,	implicit	dogwhistles	are	not	the	only	covert	perlocutionary	acts.		Another	important	kind	of	covert	perlocutionary	act	is	deception.		One	who	deceives	can	usually	only	succeed	if	their	intention	to	deceive	is	not	recognized.	This	is	the	defining	feature	of	a	covert	perlocutionary	act.		An	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle	cannot	succeed	if	the	intended	effect	is	recognized	as	intended,	so	it	is	a	covert	perlocutionary	act.		
	There	are	some	clear	advantages	to	this	account.		Since	I	understand	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	as	perlocutionary	acts,	I	need	not	understand	them	as	about	propositions.		Nor	need	I	claim	that	they	are	added	to	the	common	ground,	or	in	any	way	consciously	available	to	their	audience.		I	can	also	very	easily	make	sense	of	the	sorts	of	variation	we	have	seen:	Not	every	utterance	using	a	particular	dogwhistle	term	will	be	intended	to	have	the	same	effect,	so	we	can	give	the	right	understanding	of	the	black	speaker	describing	his	mother’s	use	of	welfare	to	earn	an	engineering	degree.		And	not	every	perlocutionary	effect	will	be	intended—so	we	can	accommodate	the	fact	that	anti-racist	attitudes	will	be	raised	to	salience	for	some	voters,	even	when	this	effect	is	not	intended.		Finally,	perlocutionary	effects	can	be	blocked,	as	Jesse	Jackson’s	utterance	eventually	began	blocking	the	intended	effects	of	the	Willie	Horton	ad.		4.2.3.2	Unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	There	is	more	than	one	way	to	fit	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	into	this	picture.		 Option	1:	Unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	are	not	themselves	covert	perlocutionary	acts,	since	the	intention	of	the	speaker	is	not	related	to	the	dogwhistle,	which	the	speaker	is	unaware	of.		So	there	can	be	no	question	of	the	act	failing	if	the	speaker’s	intention	is	recognized.		Unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles,	on	this	story,	are	simply	speech	acts	which	have	particularly	pernicious	unintended	perlocutionary	effects.		Unintended	perlocutionary	effects	are	extremely	common,	so	there’s	nothing	particular	special	going	on,	except	that	these	unintended	effects	are	a	part	of	someone	else’s	(not	the	speaker’s)	plan.		This	option	perhaps	underplays	the	role	of	manipulation.		 Option	2:	The	second	option	puts	more	of	an	emphasis	on	the	way	that	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	fit	in	to	the	manipulation	that	is	taking	place.		Those	who	create	the	initial	implicit	dogwhistles	are	very	good	at	attaching	pernicious	associations	to	words	and	images	(and	possibly	
other	things	as	well)	and	sending	them	out	into	the	world	in	the	hope	that	they	will	be	taken	up	and	used	by	others,	bringing	with	them	these	associations.		One	might,	then,	take	the	creators	of	the	dogwhistles	to	be	in	some	important	sense	the	utterers	of	the	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles.		This	would	allow	one	to	treat	the	unintentional	dogwhistles	as	covert	perlocutionary	acts,	fully	recognizing	the	way	that	they	fit	into	this	sort	of	manipulation.		The	problem	with	this	story,	though,	is	that	it	underplays	the	agency	of	those	who	repeat	the	dogwhistles.		These	people	really	are	the	speakers,	and	they	need	to	be	thought	of	as	such,	and	held	accountable	for	the	effects	of	their	speech.		On	balance,	the	best	approach	seems	to	me	to	be	Option	1.		But	it	is	important	in	adopting	this	approach	that	one	not	lose	sight	of	the	way	that	the	utterers	of	the	uninteional	implicit	dogwhistles	have	been	manipulated—and	important	to	remember	that	somebody	did	intend	the	pernicious	effects	of	these	utterances,	even	though	their	utterers	did	not.		And,	in	fact,	this	helps	us	to	see	more	about	what	is	so	insidious:	as	they	unknowingly	utter	secondary	implicit	dogwhistles,	people	are	made	into	mouthpieces	for	an	ideology	that	they	reject.	The	actual	utterers	are	the	speakers,	and	this	is	why	they	need	to	pay	attention	to	the	effects	of	what	they	say,	and	to	the	careful	manipulation	that	has	caused	them	to	say	these	things.15		A	further	advantage	of	this	approach	is	that	we	can	accommodate	two	distinct	varieties	of	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistle.	The	first	is	what	I	have	called	‘amplifier	dogwhistles’,	which	help	to	spread	the	effects	of	intentional	implicit	dogwhistles.		The	second,	which	is	not	my	focus	here,	is	unintentional	implicit																																																									15	An	especially	interesting	case	will	be	that	of	Barry	Goldwater’s	utterances	about	states’	rights.		They	were	made	with	the	intention	of	merely	commenting	on	constitutional	structure.		But	they	were	replayed	in	contexts	where	his	handlers	knew	they	would	function	as	dogwhistles.		The	initial	utterances	were	not	dogwhistles.		Their	replayings	were,	however,	unintentional	dogwhistles.		Unintentional	dogwhistles,	though,	are	not	to	be	understood	as	covert	perlocutionary	acts.		Instead	they	are	acts	which	have	unintended	(by	the	speaker)	perlocutionary	effects.		Of	course,	in	this	case	the	effects	are	unintended	by	the	speaker	but	intended	by	the	handlers	who	choose	where	and	when	to	replay	the	utterances.	
dogwhistles	which	don’t	originate	in	deliberate	attempts	to	manipulate.		It	has	been	suggested	to	me	that	‘crafty’	functions	this	way	in	sports	commentary,	dogwhistling	whiteness	but	without	any	deliberate	attempt	to	manipulate	the	salience	of	audience	members’	racial	attitudes.16		
5. Political	Upshot		Of	course,	what	makes	this	underexplored	topic	so	important	is	that	dogwhistles	represent	a	vital	part	of	strategies	by	which	we	are	influenced—in	fact,	manipulated—in	our	thinking,	and	in	our	decisions.		In	particular,	these	have	enormous	and	important	political	effects.		The	political	implications	of	dogwhistles	have	not	been	much	discussed	by	philosophers.		Robert	Goodin	and	Michael	Saward	(2005),	however,	have	discussed	the	political	implications	of	explicit	dogwhistles;	and	Jason	Stanley	has	discussed	the	political	implications	of	implicit	dogwhistles.		All	three	of	these	theorists	argue	that	dogwhistles	pose	serious	problems	for	democracy,	although	the	problems	they	identify	differ.	I	certainly	agree	that	dogwhistles	can	pose	problems	for	democracy,	but	I	don’t	fully	agree	with	any	of	these	philosophers	on	the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	problems.			
	
5.1	Dogwhistles	and	Democratic	Mandates	Goodin	and	Saward	argue	that	explicit	intentional	dogwhistles	(they	don’t	discuss	implicit	or	unintentional	dogwhistles,	so	in	fact	they	just	use	the	term	‘dogwhistle’)	may	undermine	democratic	mandates	for	particular	policies,	but	that	they	do	not	pose	difficulties	with	regard	to	a	mandate	to	rule.		Their	focus	is	on	cases	in	which	a	political	party	(or	a	politician)	advocates	a	particular	policy	using	a	phrase	that	dogwhistles	a	message	to	one	audience	which	another	audience	is	unaware	of.		To	take	an	artificial	(though	not	totally	artificial)	example,	imagine	a	party	that	trumpets	its	opposition	to	Dred	Scott	in	many	of	its	campaign	commercials.		The	party	gets	the	support	of	both	anti-racism	and																																																									16	I	am	grateful	to	Tyler	Doggett	and	Randall	Harp	for	this	suggestion.	
anti-abortion	voters.		This	party,	when	victorious,	could	not	declare	a	mandate	for	banning	abortion,	because	only	some	of	the	voters	took	this	to	be	what	they	were	voting	for.		Hence,	Goodin	and	Saward	argue,	policy	mandates	are	undermined	when	policy	preferences	are	merely	dogwhistled.		However, 
Goodin and Saward hold that a mandate to rule is not undermined in this way, 
because everybody who votes for politician P knows exactly what they are 
voting for: that politician P should rule. 
A conservative party dog-whistles an encouraging message to racists 
that its own traditional supporters would instantly repudiate. It wins the 
ensuing election. Half its voters voted for it purely because of its 
(coded) support for racist policies; half voted for it purely because of its 
traditionally decent policies on race. Clearly, the party won a majority; 
clearly, it has a mandate to rule. But under those circumstances, it 
equally clearly could not claim a policy mandate to pursue either of the 
two contradictory policies that won it its votes. (2005: 475) 
Goodin and Saward argue, then that a party cannot claim a mandate for its policies 
unless it refrains from engaging in dogwhistle politics (and more than this may be 
needed as well): It	is	worth	firmly	reminding	political	parties	that	when	they	engage	in	dog	whistle	politics	in	ordinary	general	elections,	the	same	phenomenon	that	they	are	counting	on	to	increase	their	share	of	votes	also	undercuts	the	authority	that	they	might	secure	by	winning	the	vote.	(2005:	476)	
It seems to me, however, that Goodin and Saward’s arguments do not go quite far 
enough.  If they are right about the policy mandate, then the mandate to rule may also 
often be undermined.  This will happen, for example, in the case of single-issue 
voters, of which there are likely to be many.  If a voting decision is based on abortion 
policy, and different messages are sent about this to different groups of voters, then 
surely the mandate to rule is also—in any meaningful sense—undermined. 
Now let’s turn to the case of implicit dogwhistles, which Goodin and Saward don’t 
discuss.  Implicit dogwhistles don’t involve the same sort of deception.  It’s not the 
case that some viewers of the Willie Horton ad will think that Dukakis’s prison policy 
is Q, while others will take it to be R.  What will happen, however, is that the ad’s 
target audience will vote for Bush on the basis of their racial attitudes, without 
realizing it.  Human psychology being what it is, being unaware of one’s reason for 
making a voting decision is surely widespread.  People are unaware of the extent to 
which, for example, their decision of which socks to buys is based on the location of 
the socks on the table.  It stands to reason that people would be unaware of the degree 
to which they are influenced by music in a commercial, subtleties of tone or body 
language, being reminded of a loved (or hated!) one, and so on.  If such lack of 
awareness of influences were enough to undermine democratic authority, we would 
need to give up all hope of democracy. 
However, more than this goes on with implicit dogwhistles.  In implicit dogwhistle 
cases, people make decisions on the basis of reasons that they would reject if they 
became aware of them—as we know from what happens when they are raised to 
consciousness.  Moreover, they do this as a result of being deliberately manipulated. 
This looks, on the face of it, much more like a threat to democratic mandates.   
But if this is sufficient to undermine a mandate, then once more there may in fact be 
no mandates.  What voter, after all, thinks that they should base their vote on music 
played during a campaign commercial, or on a candidate’s physical appearance?  And 
yet, all that we know about psychology suggests that factors like these are sure to 
impact voter choices.  And all that we know about the running of campaigns (and 
about advertising more generally) tells us that things like this are bound to be used by 
campaign operatives to deliberately manipulate the voters.  Being influenced by 
factors that we don’t think should influence us is, it seems to me, an inevitable part of 
the human condition.  And, since this is relatively widely known, using such factors to 
influence others will also be a standard feature of human life.  If this is sufficient to 
undermine democratic mandates, then there are no democratic mandates. 
5.2	Stanley		Stanley	is	particularly	concerned	about	what	I	am	calling	‘dogwhistles’,	because	of	the	function	that	they	serve	in	undermining	democracy.		The	terms	that	particularly	concern	him—like	‘welfare’—	have	devastating	properties:	1. Use	of	the	relevant	expression	has	the	effect	on	the	conversation	of	representing	a	certain	group	in	the	community	as	having	a	perspective	not	worthy	of	inclusion,	that	is,	they	are	not	worthy	of	respect.	
2. The	expression	has	a	content	that	can	serve	simply	to	contribute	legitimately	to	resolving	the	debate	at	issue	in	a	reasonable	way,	which	is	separate	from	its	function	as	a	mechanism	of	exclusion.	3. Mere	use	of	the	expression	is	enough	to	have	the	effect	of	eroding	reasonableness.	So	the	effect	on	reasonableness	occurs	just	by	virtue	of	using	the	expression,	in	whatever	linguistic	context”	(Stanley	2015:	130).	If	every	use	of	one	of	these	terms	has	these	effects,	then	every	use	erodes	respect	for	black	people,	and	every	use	erodes	reasonable	discussion	by	excluding	their	perspective.		This	is	obviously	enormously	damaging	for	democracy,	even	though	the	official	content	of	the	term	might	be	a	perfectly	reasonable	contribution	to	discussion.		If	Stanley	is	right,	then	dogwhistle	terms	would	indeed	be	utterly	devastating—we	simply	could	not	have	a	debate	using	terms	like	‘welfare’	because	all	participants	would	unwittingly	be	introducing	racist	not-at-issue	content	with	every	utterance,	no	matter	what	the	context,	and	no	matter	what	the	rest	of	their	utterance	contained.		If	this	were	right,	then	the	standard	liberal	remedy	for	problematic	speech—more	speech—would	be	completely	ineffectual.		There	is	much	that	is	right	in	this:	It	is	indeed	trickier	to	challenge	dogwhistles	than	it	is	to	challenge,	for	example,	overtly	racist	claims.		If	a	campaign	commercial	explicitly	asserts	that	“black	men	are	dangerous	criminals	and	Dukakis	is	insufficiently	racist”,	it	is	exceptionally	easy	to	point	out	what	is	wrong	with	the	ad.		The	racism	is	undeniable,	and	even	the	most	timid	of	journalists	will	feel	comfortable	asserting	that	racism	is	present.		Those	who	made	the	ad	will	have	no	recourse	but	to	either	apologise	or	confine	their	electoral	prospects	to	the	explicitly	racist	voter.		But	the	Willie	Horton	commercial	is	very	different.		Many	viewers	will	be	unaware	that	they	have	watched	an	ad	that	makes	their	racial	attitudes	salient.		The	ad	contains	no	overtly	racist	assertions	that	are	easily	pointed	to.		And	politicians	can,	and	did,	easily	deny	that	there	was	racism	in	the	ad	or	in	their	intentions.		Moreover,	Jesse	Jackson	was	vilified	as	“playing	the	race	card”	when	he	pointed	to	the	
racism	of	the	ad,	and	the	suggestion	was	said	to	be	ludicrous	by	mainstream	commentators.		But	as	we	have	already	seen,	the	truth	is	not	quite	this	bleak.		The	effects	of	terms	like	‘welfare’	vary	depending	(at	least)	on	the	racial	predispositions	of	one’s	audience,	on	whether	race	is	explicitly	under	discussion,	and	upon	the	rest	of	what	one	says.		Also,	recall	that	as	soon	as	Jackson	raised	the	issue	of	race	the	ad	stopped	working.		This	shows	that	in	an	extremely	important	sense	it	could	be	challenged.		And	indeed	challenged	quite	easily.		Even	those	who	thought	Jackson	was	wrong	to	raise	the	issue	of	racism	were	no	longer	affected	by	it	in	the	way	that	its	makers	intended.		Although	racism	was	now	a	part	of	the	conversation,	and	so	highly	salient,	it	was	explicitly	salient	rather	than	covertly.		The	ad	could	only	cause	them	to	use	their	racial	attitudes	in	their	voting	decisions	as	long	as	race	was	covertly	salient.		A	covert	perlocutionary	speech	act	is	(in	at	least	some	cases)	very	easily	challenged:	all	one	needs	to	do	is	to	make	what	has	been	covert	into	an	explicit	part	of	the	conversation.		But	to	fully	understand	how	to	combat	these	speech	acts,	we	must	combine	this	fact	with	insights	from	Stanley:		it	will	indeed	be	conversationally	challenging	to	make	what	has	been	covert	explicit.		People	will	reject	what	challengers	say,	and	deny	that	it	is	true.		Sanity	may	be,	and	often	is,	called	into	question.	Challengers	will	be	accused	of	having	a	political	agenda.		The	conversation	will	be	derailed,	and	it	will	not	flow	smoothly.			It	is	difficult,	just	as	Stanley	said,	and	as	a	result	it	is	hard	to	make	oneself	do	it,	or	to	persist	in	the	face	of	this	resistance.		There	are,	then,	important	lessons	here	for	those	seeking	to	fight	pernicious	covert	perlocutionary	acts.		But	if	challengers	are	aware	of	how	these	speech	acts	work,	then	it	becomes	clear	that	despite	this	resistance	it	is	well	worth	doing.		As	soon	as	the	issue	of	race	is	raised—even	if	raising	it	is	thought	to	be	a	mistake,	and	met	with	anger—the	speech	act	we	are	trying	to	fight	stops	working.		It	is	both	very	hard	to	fight	and	very	easy	to	win.		Those	seeking	to	challenge	these	pernicious	speech	acts	need	to	remind	themselves	of	the	ease	of	winning	in	order	to	gear	themselves	up	for	the	difficulty	of	the	fight.	And	importantly,	they	need	to	realize	that	winning	will	not	feel	like	winning:	those	responsible	for	the	
speech	acts	will	not	back	down,	concede	the	truth	about	what	they	were	doing,	or	apologise;	the	intended	audience	of	the	speech	acts	will	probably	insist	that	the	analysis	is	wrong	and	deny	the	existence	of	the	covert	material.		Yet	nonetheless	the	battle	will	be	won:	the	speech	acts	will	be	neutralized.		Importantly,	of	course,	we	will	only	win	these	battles	if	the	norm	of	racial	equality	is	actually	in	place.		And	whether	it	is	or	not	may	vary	a	great	deal	over	time	and	place.		We	know	from	the	sad	and	terrible	history	of	genocide	that	a	community	where	this	norm	is	in	place	can	change	remarkably	quickly	into	one	in	which	it	has	disappeared	(Tirrell	2012;	Smith	2011).		And	we	also	know	that	what	is	unacceptable	to	say	in	one	location	may	be	considered	perfectly	normal	just	30	miles	away.		For	this	reason,	it	is	undoubtedly	an	oversimplification	to	claim	that	the	norm	of	racial	equality	is	in	force.		It	is,	broadly	speaking,	in	force.		But	there	will	be	times	and	places	where	it	isn’t.		And	at	those	times	and	places,	raising	the	issue	of	race	will	not	neutralize	a	racial	dogwhistle.		(For	more	complexities	on	this	point,	consider	the	difficulties	raised	earlier	concerning	the	content	of	the	norm.)17				Another	limitation	is	also	important	to	emphasise.		What	I	have	argued	is	that	explicitly	raising	the	issue	of	race	can	defuse	a	racial	dogwhistle.		This	a	defensive	maneuver	against	a	very	particular	sort	of	political	manipulation.		It	seems	to	be	highly	effective.		But	it	does	not	alter	attitudes:	the	racial	resentment	may	not	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	voting	choice,	but	it	remains.		Nor	does	it	alter	concrete	realities	in	the	world.		Centuries	of	violence,	discrimination	and	segregation	are	not	changed	via	a	rhetorical	maneuver.		The	world	we	live	in	remains	just	as	much	structured	by	racism	after	a	dogwhistle	has	been	openly	discussed	as	it	was	before.		It	is	vital	to	openly	discuss	the	dogwhistles,	but	this	should	not	be	mistaken	for	something	more	powerful	than	it	is.																																																										17	Nor	will	it	neutralize	it	for	those	individuals	who	simply	disagree	with	the	norm,	for	even	when	and	where	the	norm	is	in	place	there	are	openly	racist	people	who	explicitly	deny	the	norm.		But,	of	course,	those	people	don’t	need	to	be	dogwhistled	to	in	order	to	activate	their	racism:	they	are	happy	to	deliberately	vote	for	the	racist	candidate.	
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